World War II: Targeted Aerial Objectives for Retaliatory Gas Attacks on Germany and Japan

Description

This document collection, totaling 969 pages, details potential aerial targets for retaliatory chemical warfare attacks against Germany and Japan during World War II. The core of the collection consists of two substantial reports.

The first report, a 123-page document from March 11, 1944, produced by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, analyzes potential targets in Germany for USAAF retaliation should Germany employ chemical weapons. This report acknowledges inherent limitations in such a retaliatory program. It assesses the USAAF’s capacity for such an operation and identifies suitable German cities as targets. The report’s conclusions, however, are presented as provisional, contingent upon future operational experience gained by both the USAAF and the Chemical Warfare Service. Despite this caveat, the report aims to provide a reasonable framework for planning a retaliatory gas attack.

The second report, a 121-page document from December 1944, prepared by the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service and the Air Chemical Officer, focuses on potential targets in Formosa (Taiwan). This report’s purpose is to equip field chemical officers with relevant data for incorporating into their objective folders, specifically targeting key and high-priority tactical gas targets on the island. The report explicitly states that the intelligence used is incomplete and subject to revision as the situation evolves and more complete information becomes available. The inherent uncertainties of wartime intelligence are clearly acknowledged.

In short, the collection presents a snapshot of wartime planning for chemical warfare retaliation, highlighting the complexities of target selection, the limitations of available intelligence, and the tentative nature of strategic planning in the face of evolving circumstances. The inclusion of both German and Japanese targets reflects the geographically dispersed nature of the war and the potential for chemical warfare on multiple fronts. The existence of additional, unspecified material further suggests a more comprehensive collection of planning documents related to this sensitive and controversial aspect of World War II. Stephen L. McFarland’s 1997 lecture, “Battles Not Fought: The Creation of an Independent Air Forces,” delivered at the United States Air Force Academy, explored the historical development of a separate air force. McFarland, a history professor at Auburn University and former visiting professor at the Air War College, presented his insights on this significant military evolution.

Separately, the U.S. Army Center for Military History published a comprehensive 716-page account titled “United States Army in World War II The Technical Services The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals In Combat.” This book, the final installment in a three-part series, focuses on the Chemical Warfare Service’s (CWS) wartime experiences abroad. The volume details the CWS’s administrative functions, logistical operations, and direct involvement in combat situations.

The abstract summarizes the CWS’s unusual predicament during World War II. The service diligently prepared for chemical warfare, a type of conflict that ultimately did not materialize. Despite this, the CWS played a crucial role, acting as a deterrent against enemy gas attacks while simultaneously adapting to a war fought without chemical weapons. This dual responsibility—maintaining readiness for retaliatory gas use (as per U.S. policy) while simultaneously providing valuable support in a gas-free environment—highlights the CWS’s flexibility and importance throughout the war.