Vietnam War My Lai Massacre Department of Defense

Description

My Lai Massacre: A Timeline and Key Figures

My Lai Massacre Timeline

March 15, 1968:

• Colonel Oran K. Henderson, the new 11th Brigade commander, visits the Task Force (TF) Barker command post. He urges aggressive action to eliminate the 48th VC Local Force (LF) Battalion.
• Following Henderson’s remarks, LTC Frank A. Barker and his staff provide an intelligence briefing and issue an operations order for an operation into Son My Village (specifically the subhamlet of My Lai).
• Company commanders are told that most of the population of Son My are “VC or VC sympathizers” and that most civilians would be away at market by 0700 hours the next day.
• LTC Barker reportedly orders the commanders of C/1-20 Inf and possibly B/4-3 Inf to burn houses, kill livestock, destroy foodstuffs, and perhaps close wells. No instructions are given regarding the safeguarding of noncombatants.
• Captain Ernest Medina briefs his men in C/1-20 Inf, allegedly embellishing Barker’s orders, adding a revenge element, and stating that only the enemy would be present in My Lai and were to be destroyed.
• Captain Eugene Michles briefs his platoon leaders in C/1-20 Inf, apparently mentioning the burning of dwellings.

March 16, 1968 (The My Lai Massacre):

• Morning (0725 hours): A short artillery preparation precedes the assault.
• 0750 hours: All elements of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (C/1-20 Inf) are on the ground after a combat assault landing west of My Lai.
• Before 0800 hours: Members of C/1-20 Inf kill several Vietnamese civilians fleeing the area in the rice paddies and along Route 521. No resistance is encountered.
• Around 0800 hours: The infantry assault on My Lai begins.
• During the morning:1st Platoon (C/1-20 Inf): Moving through the southern half of My Lai, members engage in rapes and widespread killing of unarmed Vietnamese inhabitants (mostly old men, women, and children), as well as property destruction. They round up approximately 70-80 Vietnamese and shoot them in a large ditch east of My Lai. Another group of 20-50 is taken south and shot on a trail. Smaller groups are also killed within the subhamlet.
• 2nd Platoon (C/1-20 Inf): Sweeping through the northern half of My Lai and the subhamlet of Binh Tay, they kill at least 60-70 Vietnamese men, women, and children and commit several rapes.
• 3rd Platoon (C/1-20 Inf): After securing the landing zone, they follow the 1st and 2nd Platoons, burning and destroying remaining houses, killing most of the remaining livestock, and killing a group of 7-12 women and children.
• Between 0815 and 0830 hours: Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry (B/4-3 Inf) is air landed east of My Lai. They encounter little resistance, but the 2nd Platoon suffers casualties from mines or boobytraps.
• Around 0920 hours: The 2nd Platoon (C/1-20 Inf) reportedly receives an order to stop the killing and promptly complies.
• Around 1030 hours: The 1st Platoon (C/1-20 Inf) reportedly receives a second order to stop killing, by which time they have completed their sweep.
• Morning Hours: An aero-scout team from Company B, 123d Aviation Battalion, including pilot Hugh Thompson Jr., observes the killings from low altitude. Thompson becomes concerned and lands his helicopter multiple times to aid civilians and attempts to stop the killings.
• During the morning: Hugh Thompson Jr., along with crew members Spc. Lawrence Colburn and Spc. Glenn Andreotta, land their helicopter between American troops and a group of Vietnamese civilians hiding in a bunker, threatening to open fire on the U.S. troops if they continue the attack.
• Throughout the morning: Elements of the 1st Platoon (B/4-3 Inf) move eastward, cross the Song My Khe (My Khe River), and open fire on the subhamlet of My Khe with a machine gun and rifles for approximately five minutes, killing some inhabitants (mostly women and children). They then enter My Khe, firing into houses and throwing demolitions, resulting in more noncombatant deaths.
• Early Afternoon: Company C, 1-20 Inf departs My Lai, moving northeast to link up with B/4-3 Inf. They are estimated to have killed at least 175-200 Vietnamese civilians, with only 3 or 4 confirmed as Viet Cong.
• Evening of March 16, 1968: After linking up in a night defensive position, a Viet Cong suspect is reportedly tortured and maimed by a U.S. officer and subsequently killed by Vietnamese National Police in the presence of U.S. personnel.

March 17-19, 1968:

• Both C/1-20 Inf and B/4-3 Inf are involved in additional burning and destruction of dwellings and mistreatment of Vietnamese detainees.

After March 16-19, 1968:

• Following the operation, the commander of C/1-20 Inf allegedly advises his men not to discuss the incident due to an ongoing investigation and advises one individual not to write to his Congressman. He also reportedly makes a false report stating only 20-28 noncombatants were killed, attributing it to artillery and gunships.
• Within the Americal Division, actions and omissions at various command levels effectively conceal the Son My incident. Advisory teams at Province, District, and possibly the 2nd ARVN Division also contribute to this concealment. No reports of the crimes are made by members of the involved units.

Approximately One Year Later:

• Ron Ridenhour, a soldier who heard secondhand accounts of the events at “Pinkville,” begins a letter-writing campaign detailing what he learned.

November 12, 1969:

• Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh breaks the story of the My Lai Massacre to the American public.

Two Months Before November 1969:

• U.S. Army Lieutenant William Calley is charged with murder.

1970:

• The House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee conducts hearings on the My Lai Incident.
• The Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary holds hearings on refugee and civilian war casualty problems in Indochina.
• The Department of the Army releases the “Peers Inquiry” report, detailing the investigation into the My Lai incident and the subsequent cover-up.

1971:

• Lieutenant William Calley is convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.
• President Richard Nixon orders Calley released from prison two days after his sentencing.

1971-1974:

• William Calley spends three and a half years under house arrest at Fort Benning.

Later:

• Captain Ernest Medina is acquitted at his trial.
• Ronald Haeberle’s photographs of the My Lai Massacre become widely published, bringing the graphic reality of the event to public attention.
• 1973: Chaplain Major Harry P. Kissinger and Chaplain Colonel Francis R. Lewis are interviewed as part of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Oral History Program, discussing their knowledge of the My Lai Massacre.
• 2003: Hugh Thompson Jr. gives a presentation at the United States Naval Academy titled “Moral Courage In Combat: The My Lai Story.”
• Thirty years after the incident: Hugh Thompson Jr., Lawrence Colburn, and Glenn Andreotta (posthumously) are awarded the Soldier’s Medal for their bravery in attempting to stop the massacre.

Cast of Characters

• LTC Frank A. Barker: The commander of Task Force (TF) Barker, the battalion-sized unit responsible for the operation into Son My Village. He reportedly issued the initial orders regarding the destruction of the village and the disposition of the population.
• Colonel Oran K. Henderson: The commander of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade. He visited TF Barker on March 15, 1968, and urged aggressive action against the perceived enemy in Son My Village.
• Captain Ernest Medina: The commander of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (C/1-20 Inf), the unit primarily responsible for the killings at My Lai. He allegedly embellished LTC Barker’s orders during his briefing to his men, contributing to the environment that led to the massacre. He was later acquitted at trial.
• Captain Eugene Michles: A company commander within TF Barker who briefed his platoon leaders in C/1-20 Inf, apparently mentioning the burning of dwellings.
• Hugh Thompson Jr.: A U.S. Army helicopter pilot from Company B, 123d Aviation Battalion, who, along with his crew, witnessed the massacre from the air and intervened to save Vietnamese civilians. He landed his helicopter multiple times and threatened to fire on U.S. troops to stop the killings. He was later awarded the Soldier’s Medal.
• Spc. Lawrence Colburn: A door gunner on Hugh Thompson’s helicopter crew who supported Thompson’s efforts to stop the massacre and protect civilians. He was later awarded the Soldier’s Medal.
• Spc. Glenn Andreotta: A crew chief on Hugh Thompson’s helicopter who also participated in the efforts to rescue civilians. He died in action three weeks after the My Lai Massacre but was posthumously awarded the Soldier’s Medal.
• Ron Ridenhour: A soldier who was not present at My Lai but heard secondhand accounts of the massacre after returning home. He initiated a letter-writing campaign that eventually brought the story to public attention.
• Seymour Hersh: An investigative reporter who broke the story of the My Lai Massacre to the American public in November 1969, based in part on Ron Ridenhour’s information.
• Lt. William Calley: A platoon leader in Company C, 1-20 Inf, who was charged with and convicted of murder for his role in the My Lai Massacre. He was sentenced to life in prison, but his sentence was later reduced, and he served time under house arrest.
• Ronald Haeberle: A U.S. Army Public Information Detachment photographer who accompanied Company C on March 16, 1968. His graphic photographs of the massacre provided crucial evidence and had a significant impact on public perception.
• Stanley R. Resor: The Secretary of the Army who, along with General William C. Westmoreland, directed Lieutenant General William R. Peers to investigate the initial Army inquiries into the My Lai incident.
• General William C. Westmoreland: The U.S. Army Chief of Staff who, along with Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, ordered the “Peers Inquiry” into the My Lai incident.
• Lieutenant General William R. Peers: The U.S. Army officer who led the Department of the Army’s review of the preliminary investigations into the My Lai incident (the “Peers Inquiry”).
• Chaplain Major Harry P. Kissinger: The chaplain assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, who was interviewed in 1973 about his knowledge and insight regarding the My Lai Massacre.
• Chaplain Colonel Francis R. Lewis: The Americal Division chaplain who was also interviewed in 1973 about the My Lai Massacre.

Vietnam War My Lai Massacre Department of Defense Documents

25,800 pages of Department of Defense documents and other material dealing with the My Lai Massacre.

INCIDENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTIONS
SAMPLE PAGES

INCIDENT

During the period 16-19 March 1968, a tactical operation was conducted into Son My Village, Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam, by Task Force (TF) Barker, a battalion-size unit of the Americal Division. The Task Force was composed of a rifle company from each of the 11th Brigade’s three organic infantry battalions; Company A, 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry (A/3-1 Inf), Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry (B/4-3 Inf), and Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (C/1-20 Inf). TF Barker was an interim organization of the 11th Brigade, created to fill a tactical void resulting from the withdrawal of a Republic of Korea Marine Brigade from the Quang Ngai area. The commander was LTC Frank A. Barker.

The plans for the operation were never reduced to writing, but it was reportedly aimed at destroying the 48th VC Local Force (LF) Battalion, thought to be located in Son My Village, which also served as a VC staging and logistical support base.  On two previous operations in the area, units of TF Barker had received casualties from enemy fire, mines, and boobytraps.

On 15 March 1968, the new 11th Brigade commander, Colonel Oran K. Henderson, visited the TF Barker command post. He urged them to press forward aggressively and eliminate the 48th LF Battalion.  Following these remarks, LTC Barker and his staff gave an intelligence briefing and issued an operations order.  The company commanders were told that most of the population of Son My were “VC or VC sympathizers” and were advised that most of the civilian inhabitants would be away from Son My and on their way to market by 0700 hours.  The operation was to commence at 0725 hours on 16 March 1968 with a short artillery preparation, following which C/1-20 Inf was to combat assault into an LZ immediately west of My Lai and then sweep east through the subhamlet.  Following C Company’s landing, B/4-3 Inf was to reinforce C/1-20 Inf, or to conduct a second combat assault to the east of My Lai into an LZ south of the subhamlet of My Lai. The U.S. Army slang name for the hamlets and sub-hamlets in that area was “Pinkville.”  A/3-1 Inf was to move from its field location to blocking positions north of Son My.

During or subsequent to the briefing, LTC Barker ordered the commanders of C/1-20 Inf, and possibly B/4-3 Inf, to burn the houses, kill the livestock, destroy foodstuffs and perhaps to close the wells.  No instructions were issued as to the safeguarding of noncombatants found there. During a subsequent briefing by Captain Medina to his men, LTC Barker’s orders were embellished, a revenge element was added, and the men of C/1-20 Inf, were given to understand that only the enemy would be present in My Lai on 16 March and that the enemy was to be destroyed.  In CPT Michles’ briefing to his platoon leaders, mention was also apparently made of the burning of dwellings.

On the morning of 16 March 1968, the operation began as planned. By 0750 hours all elements of C/1-20 Inf were on the ground. Before entering My Lai, they killed several Vietnamese fleeing the area in the rice paddies around the subhamlet and along Route 521 to the south of the subhamlet.  No resistance was encountered at this time or later in the day. The infantry assault on My Lai began a few minutes before 0800 hours.  During the 1st Platoon’s movement through the southern half of the subhamlet, its members were involved in rapes and widespread killing of Vietnamese inhabitants, comprised almost exclusively of old men, women, and children, and also in property destruction.  Most of the inhabitants who were not killed immediately were rounded up into two groups.  The first group, consisting of about 70-80 Vietnamese, was taken to a large ditch east of My Lai and later shot.  A second group, consisting of 20-50 Vietnamese, was taken south of the hamlet and shot there on a trail.  Similar killings of smaller groups took place within the subhamlet. Members of the 2d Platoon killed at least 60-70 Vietnamese men, women, and children, as they swept through the northern half of My Lai and through Binh Tay, a small subhamlet about 400 meters north of My Lai.  They also committed several rapes. The 3d Platoon, having secured the LZ, followed behind the 1st and 2d and burned and destroyed what remained of the houses in My Lai and killed most of the remaining livestock.  Its members also rounded up and killed a group of 7-12 women and children.

There was considerable testimony during the Pentagon’s hearings that orders to stop the killing were issued two or three times during the morning. The 2d Platoon received such an order around 0920 hours and promptly complied. The 1st Platoon continued the killings until perhaps 1030 hours, when the order was repeated. By this time the 1st Platoon had completed its sweep through the subhamlet. By the time C/1-20 Inf departed My Lai in the early afternoon, moving to the northeast for link-up with B/4-3 Inf, its members had killed at least 175-200 Vietnamese men, women, and children. The evidence indicates that only 3 or 4 were confirmed as Viet Cong although there were undoubtedly several unarmed VC (men, women, and children) among them and many more active supporters and sympathizers.  One man from the company was reported as wounded from the accidental discharge of his weapon.

Since C Company had encountered no enemy opposition, B/4-3 Inf was air landed in its LZ between 0815 and 0830 hours, following a short artillery preparation.  Little if any resistance was encountered, although the 2nd Platoon suffered 1 KIA and 7 WIA from mines and/or boobytraps.  The 1st Platoon moved eastward separately from the rest of B Company to cross and secure a bridge over the Song My Khe (My Khe River).  After crossing the bridge and approaching the outskirts of the subhamlet Of My Khe, elements of the platoon opened fire on the subhamlet with an M-60 machinegun and M-16 rifles.  The fire continued for approximately 5 minutes, during which time some inhabitants of My Khe, mostly women and children, were killed. The lead elements of the platoon then entered the subhamlet, firing into the houses and throwing demolitions into shelters.  Many noncombatants apparently were killed in the process.

On the evening of 16 March 1968, after C/1-20 Inf and B/4-3 Inf had linked up in a night defensive position, a Viet Cong suspect was apparently tortured and maimed by a US officer.  He was subsequently killed along with some additional suspects by Vietnamese National Police in the presence of US personnel. During the period 17-19 March 1968 both C/1-20 Inf and B/4-3 Inf were involved in additional burning and destruction of dwellings, and in the mistreatment of Vietnamese detainees.

One element which provided combat support to TF Barker on 16 March was an aero-scout team from Company B, 123d Aviation Battalion.  A pilot of this team, Hugh Thompson, had been flying at a low altitude over My Lai during the morning hours and had observed the actions of C/1-20 Inf.  He became greatly concerned over the “needless and unnecessary killings” he had witnessed.  He landed his helicopter several times to aid the inhabitants in an attempt to stop the killing. Thompson landed his helicopter between American troops and a group of Vietnamese hiding in a bunker. Thompson and two of his crew members, Spc. Lawrence Colburn and Spc. Glenn Andreotta, threaten to open fire on U.S. troops if they continued the attack. Thirty years later, the three were awarded the Soldier’ Medal, the army’s highest award for bravery not involving enemy combat.

Within the Americal Division, at every command level from company to division, actions were taken or omitted which together effectively concealed the Son My incident.  Outside the division, advisory teams at Province, District and possibly the 2d ARVN Division also contributed to this end.  Some of the acts and omissions that resulted in concealment of the incident were inadvertent while others constituted deliberate suppression or withholding of information. No reports of the crimes committed by C/1-20 Inf and B/4 – 3 Inf during the operation were made by members of the units, although there were many men in both companies who had not participated in any criminal acts.  The commander of C/1-20 Inf assembled his men after the operation and advised them not to discuss the incident because an investigation was being conducted, and he advised one individual not to write to his Congressman about the incident.  He also made a false report that only 20-28 noncombatants had been killed and attributed the cause of death to artillery and gunships.

One year later, A soldier, Ron Ridenhour, after returning home began a letter writing campaign. Ridenhour heard secondhand accounts about what happened at Pinkville. His story eventually reached investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, who broke the story to the American public on November 12, 1969. U.S. Army Lt. William Calley was charged with murder two months before Hersh reported the story. Calley was convicted in 1971 of murder and sentenced to life in prison. President Richard Nixon ordered Calley released from prison two days later. Calley spent three and a half years under house arrest in his quarters at Fort Benning. Calley claimed he was following orders from Captain Medina, who was acquitted at trial.

The MY Lai massacre, like many other events in Vietnam, was captured on camera by U.S. Army personnel. The most published and graphic images were taken by Ronald Haeberle, a U.S. Army Public Information Detachment photographer who accompanied the men of Charlie Company that day. In this collection photos can be found in Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident Volume III Exhibits Book 6 – Photographs.

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTIONS

Material In the collection consists of:

Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident – Peers Inquiry.

In November 1969, Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, and General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, directed Lieutenant General William R. Peers, U.S. Army, to “explore the nature and scope of the original Army investigations of what occurred on 16 March 1968 in Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.” This collection of materials, commonly known as the “Peers Inquiry,” provides the results of General Peers’ investigation of the “My Lai incident,” later also known as the “My Lai massacre.”

The records comprising this collection are subdivided into four groupings or volumes.

Volume I – Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident – This 393-page March 1970 report of the incident. Among the many topics covered in the report are: The organization, operations, and training of the Americal 23d Division. An overview of the preparations for the Son My operation. Significant factors which contributed to the Son My incident. History of the people of Quang Hgai Province. Enemy tactics and techniques in the region. Detailed description of the events involving the actions of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (C/l-20 Inf), Company B, 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry (B/4-3 Inf) and Company A, 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry (A/3-1 Inf). Policy and directives as to rules of engagement and treatment of noncombatants. Viet Cong propaganda about the incident. The suppression and withholding of information on the incident.

Volume II – Testimony of all Witnesses – Volume II consists of 32 books comprising the testimony and summaries of testimony of all witnesses who appeared before the Peers Inquiry. The testimony and summaries have been grouped together according to the organization to which the individual witness was assigned or attached in March 1968. Within these organizational groupings, the testimony and summaries of testimony of individuals are arranged in alphabetical order according to the individual’s last name.

Volume III – Exhibits – Contains Directives, Reports, Miscellaneous Documents, Maps, Overlays, Sketches, Drawings, Statements, Photographs

Volume IV – CID Statements – This volume contains CID statements received prior to the submission of this report. Only those considered to be relevant to this inquiry were included. Also considered were the CID statements summarizing the interviews of Vietnamese civilians and military personnel. The names of these Vietnamese and other non-Vietnamese personnel interviewed by the CID have been included.

Hugh Thompson United States Navy Academy (USNA) Presentation Transcript (2003)

A transcript of Thompson’s presentation at the USNA, “Moral Courage In Combat: The My Lai Story.” Hugh Thompson Jr., a former U.S. Army helicopter pilot is credited with saving the lives of  Vietnamese civilians during the My Lai massacre.

 
The My Lai Massacre: A Case Study. By Major Tony Raimondo, School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Georgia.

A 23-page outline of information about the My Lai Massacre for use by School of the Americas’ instructors as part of the school’s human rights program. The United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA), provides military education and training to the nations of Latin America. The case study covers the background of the My Lai incident, the causes of the My Lai Massacre, and addresses how the My Lai Massacre could have been prevented.

11th Light Infantry Brigade Newsletter – April 12, 1968

The first issue of the Brigade’s newsletter following the massacre.

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

 Investigation of the My Lai Incident Hearings of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Ninety-First Congress (1970) – 888 pages of transcripts of closed testimony in front of the My Lai Incident Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services. Most  witnesses were military personnel with direct knowledge of matter related to My Lai, including Captain Medina, Lt. Hugh C. Thompson.

Investigation of the My Lai Incident Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Ninety-First Congress (1970)

Refugee and Civilian War Casualty Problems in Laos And Cambodia Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Ninety-First Congress Second Session (1970) – A Report On The Subcommittee Hearings on War Related Civilian Problems In Indochina

Judge Advocates in Vietnam: Army Lawyers in Southeast Asia 1959-1975 by Colonel Frederic L. Borch III

This 174-page U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute publication is a narrative history of Army lawyers in Vietnam from 1959, when the first judge advocate reported for duty in Vietnam, to 1975, when the last Army lawyer left Saigon. Its principal theme is that, as the Army developed new strategies and tactics to combat the guerilla war waged by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, Army judge advocates also discovered that the unconventional nature of the war required them to find new ways of using the law, and their skills as lawyers, to enhance mission success.

Judge Advocates in Vietnam identifies the men and women who deployed to Southeast Asia; it looks at selected courts-martial, military personnel and foreign claims, legal assistance, administrative and contract law issues, and international law matters handled by those judge advocates. Mention of issues dealing with the My Lai incident is dispersed throughout the publication.

U.S. Army Chaplaincy Oral History Program Transcripts

99 pages of Historical Office U.S. Army Chaplain School oral history interview transcripts. These two transcripts were produced in 1973 from tape-recorded interviews conducted as part of a project under the Chief of Chaplains to produce a history of the chaplaincy. Interviewed are Chaplain Major Harry P. Kissinger and Chaplain Colonel Francis R. Lewis. Chaplain Kissinger was the chaplain assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry and Chaplain Lewis was the Ameri-Cal Division chaplain. Both men are questioned about their knowledge and insight regarding the My Lai massacre transcripts. These two transcripts were produced in 1973 from tape-recorded interviews conducted as part of a project under the Chief of Chaplains to produce a history of the chaplaincy. Interviewed are Chaplain Major Harry P. Kissinger and Chaplain Colonel Francis R. Lewis. Chaplain Kissinger was the chaplain assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry and Chaplain Lewis was the Ameri-Cal Division chaplain. Both men are questioned about their knowledge and insight regarding the My Lai massacre.

Department of Defense Pamphlet  “Pocket Guide to Vietnam”

A pocket guide for service personnel in Vietnam, includes the nine rules for personnel of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Defense Department Studies

2,225 pages of  theses, surveys, occasion papers, commissioned reports and various monographs about My Lai , or which make significant reference to the massacre, or addresses issues closely related to My Lai. They include:

Lessons From My Lai (1973)

A Comparative Analysis Into U.S. Military Abuses at the My Lai Massacre And Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal (2015)

No Gun Ri Incident Implications for the U.S. Army (2001)

The Public Image of the Military in Leading Magazines (1968-1970) (1971)

Marine Corps Ethics Is It Time For Codification (1973)

Values, Preferences And Perceptions Concerning Military Service (1973)

Values, Preferences And Perceptions Concerning Military Service Part II (1974)

Ethics and the Military Profession A Dialogue on the Law of War (1980)

The Strategic Lessons  Learned in Vietnam Volume VII – The Soldier (1981)

Command Criminal Responsibility A Plea For a Workable Standard (1982)

Marines and Military Law in Vietnam Trial by Fire (1989)

The Obligation to Protect Human Rights A New Legal Obligation for Commanders (1996)

Narrative In Army Values Training (2004)

Moral and Ethical Decision Making (2005)

Leadership The Decisive Factor in the Ethical Performance of Units (2006)

Acts of Atrocity Effects on Public Opinion Support (2007)

American Military Ethics Stalwart in a Changing Society (2011)

Dehumanization and Irregular Warfare (2013)

To Take Care of Them An Ethical Case Study of the Canal Incident (2013)

Followership An Essential Ingredient of Leadership (2015)

Debunking the Myth of the Strategic Corporal (2015)

Restoring the Shield Westmoreland and the Recovery of Military Professionalism (2016)

Lack of Emotional Intelligence as a Factor in the Relief of US Army Commanders (2018)

 
GENEVA CONVENTION

Documents concerning the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, from the American Red Cross, International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

 
VOICE OF AMERICA TRANSCRIPTS

Voice of America transcripts of the reporting of My Lai history.